The article compares al-Qaeda and ISIS, which despite similar origins have developed distinct paths and goals. According to our analytical framework, this is because al-Qaeda appears to use terror as a tool to induce other audiences into particular behaviors, expecting to change the correlation of forces in its favor in the future, while ISIS is a more complex organization whose primary goal is to build a new political order in territories it occupies. The results highlight the problems of treating both organizations as terrorist groups and contribute to debates on conceptually defining terrorism.
denounced the extremist excesses of ISIS, which suggests that both organizations compete for supporters around the world 6 . One can see that, despite the initial similarities, the two groups behave differently. As a result, based on a synthesized framework, we organize this analysis around two questions: What are the logics of action for the two groups? What are the implications of these logics for their behavior?
The argument to be developed is the following: while al-Qaeda seems to use terror with the intention of inducing a certain behavior in another public that can alter the correlation of forces in its favor for the future, given that it is a weak actor vis-à-vis its principal contender, ISIS is a more complex organization that is also interested in installing a new political order in the territories that it occupies. Such logics and objectives therefore produce different behaviors despite political and ideological similarities.
The article is structured into three sections. First, we conduct a literature review about the academic production on terrorism studies, adding our analytic framework. The second section starts by examining al-Qaeda, followed by ISIS. Finally, we present our final conclusions.
Debates about terrorism
Based on reviews from Reid (1997) and Ranstorp (2009) , it is possible to identify stages in what is conventionally called terrorism studies. According to them, systematic and consistent research can be found starting in the 1970s, with Gurr (1970) , Rapaport (1971) and Crenshaw (1972) . To some degree, it is possible to argue that the main trigger for these investigations was the concept of urban guerrilla warfare, stemming from experiences with groups such as Baader Meinhof in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. Among the main findings of this group of studies was one argument about the political nature of terrorism -in other words, how the logic of action of these groups longed for the reversal of a particular status quo.
If this first stage included the publication of important work and the emergence of notable research centers, such as the RAND Corporation program on terrorism led by Brian Jenkins in 1972, the interval between the 1980s and 1990s was ___________________________________________________________________________ 6 Available at ˂http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-leaderayman-al-zawahiri-isis-madness-lies-extremism-islamic-state-terrorist-groups-competea7526271.html˃. Accessed on January 14, 2007.
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(2018) 12 (1) e0002 -4/27 one of relative stagnation. According to Ranstorp (2009) , the number of books and articles, the level of collaborations, and the sources of financing all declined in relation to the previous period. Furthermore, adds Reid (1997) , most publications were the products of a small group of researchers, who established important conceptual and methodological milestones in the field, as well as research topics.
It is from this period that the controversial concept of new terrorism emerged.
Initially developed to reflect the terrorist attacks in Lebanon during the 1980s, but reinforced by the World Trade Center explosion in 1993 and the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo metro in 1995 (Nasser, 2014) , the propagators of the idea argued that a qualitative transformation had occurred in the practice of terrorism. In contrast to the terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s, new terrorism had cultural and religious matrices.
Additionally, they argued that a technological transformation had created the conditions for disproportionate actions, which could culminate in a much larger number of victims.
The literature produced up to that point was heavily criticized. For some, the conclusions reached were naïve descriptions, speculative comments, and prescriptions without either theoretical or empirical bases (GURR, 1988) . For others, the field was static, with the same hypotheses and definitions always continuing to be analyzed and assimilated (REID, 1997) . No less important, Silke (2004) questioned the insulation of researchers in this period, restricted to secondary sources and without the necessary engagement with fieldwork.
The growth in academic production about terrorism came from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . According to estimates made by Ranstorp (2009, p. 17) , while there had been just over 100 peer-reviewed articles published in 2001, the number rose drastically by 2007, when there were more than 2,300 citations.
Furthermore, Silke (2009, p. 34) The literature produced after September 11, despite the increase in financing and greater public interest, was heavily criticized. Among the main accusations were that: 01. Most of the conclusions still depended more on secondary sources than on primary ones, particularly research from the field; 02. The literature's focus was restricted to certain topics, especially those that were more policy-oriented, providing intellectual justifications for controversial counterterrorism practices perpetrated by the U.S. government; 03. The tendency to treat terrorism as something unprecedented and exceptional (JACKSON, 2008; RAPHAEL, 2009 ).
It was no coincidence that such criticisms opened the way for a fourth stage in terrorism studies, interested above all in critical analyses centered on the nature of terrorism, as well as terrorism and counterterrorism policies (SMYTH et al., 2008) .
Among the questions posed to the post-September 11 work, one is of particular interest: the conceptual debate about the phenomenon of terrorism. Jackson (2008, p. 172) argues that there exist no less than 200 distinct definitions of terrorism in the literature. Moreover, Silke (2004, p. 207) concludes from 490 articles published between 1990 and 1999 that only 1.6% of them could be understood as theoretical discussions whose objective was to build a concept of terrorism. One explanation for this lacuna stems from the fact that many analysts avoided such debates by adopting the definitions of states and international organisms, which conceptualize terrorism as violence committed exclusively by non-state actors (JACKSON, 2008) . The route outlined by Wight (2009; is to interrogate terrorism starting with its relationship with the modern state. According to the author, the consolidation of the state can be understood as a long trajectory of appropriation and accumulation -of territories, people, and resources -reached through the use of violence. The success of these processes of monopolizations culminated in the acceptance of that political entity as the most legitimate, but it hides the fact that it comes from a violent history and that terrorism and other forms of non-state violence were reactions to such monopolies. In sum, the argument developed is that terrorism is a form of political violence among many others -war, insurgency, genocide, etc -whose emergence should be understood as the response to a specific sociopolitical conjuncture.
To refine the distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence, we need to understand their strategic logics. This encompasses evaluating if acts of terror are directly or indirectly linked to the desired political changes. Within this arena of debate, we propose a distinction between two types of arguments. On the one hand, there is the idea of a direct link between the use of terror and political change. We can find this idea, for example, in the seminal work of Pape (2005) , which discusses the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, and Kydd and Walter (2006) , which is about terrorism strategies.
According to Pape (2005) , terrorism can be understood as the use of violence by a non-state organization to intimidate a certain audience. Likewise, Pape (2005) emphasizes that, in general terms, the purposes of terrorism are recruiting more supporters and putting their opponents under duress. From this, it follows that most campaigns of terrorism look to accomplish both of these objectives, but that there is a need to balance them and prioritize certain objectives vis-à-vis specific conjunctures.
Such a necessity to prioritize culminates in different forms of terrorism.
We have, then, 'demonstrative terrorism', which looks for publicity for a certain cause. Second, the goal of 'destructive terrorism' is to coerce opponents through the threat of death and to mobilize support for its cause. Here, Pape (2005) argues that terrorists look to inflict damage on members of the target-audience, running the risk of losing others' sympathy, which is not necessarily the case with demonstrative terrorism. 'Suicide terrorism' looks to coerce the target-audience without taking into consideration if it will cause hostility, not only in relation to the act, but also vis-à-vis other observers. A distinctive trait of this type of terrorism is that the terrorist does not expect to survive the mission. Furthermore, Pape (2005) argues that the majority of terrorist attacks are not isolated acts committed by fanatical individuals, but rather parts of larger campaigns conducted by groups with the aim of achieving a certain political goal.
According to Kydd and Walter (2006) , terrorism works not only because of the fact that it induces fear in target populations, but above all because it makes governments and individuals respond in the way that terrorists want. In this sense, terrorists would be too weak to impose their will directly through force. However, they would at times be strong enough to persuade audiences to do what they want because they are capable of altering the perception of these people, mainly when they are able to impose high costs and show a high degree of commitment to their cause.
Based on this argument, Kydd and Walter (2006) lay out five strategic logics for terrorism. First, we have 'the strategy of attrition', where terrorists look to persuade the enemy that they are strong enough to impose costs if a certain political orientation is maintained. There is also 'intimidation', when they look to convince a population that they are capable of punishing disobedience and that the government will not be able to stop them. The 'strategy of provocation' consists of inducing the enemy to respond to terrorism with violence, hoping that this will then make the population come to support the terrorists. 'Spoiler attacks' are efforts to convince the audience that moderate terrorists are weak and do not deserve support, making peace agreements more difficult. Finally, the strategy of 'outbidding' consists of the use of violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater chances of victory than rival groups, and therefore deserve their support.
Conversely, we also have the argument that the link between acts of terror and political change is indirect, exemplified in Diniz (2004) and Mendes (2014) .
Understanding terrorism as a social phenomenon implies discussing it in terms of its means and ends. In regard to the means used, one can usually characterize terrorism as the use of, or the threat to use, force. However, such an understanding is incomplete,
given that the means used by terrorism is the use of, or the threat to use, force in a specific way: terror. Terror, therefore, is analytically different from force. In a war, for example, force has weight in and of itself given that destruction caused by it affects the balance of forces among contenders. The destruction caused by terrorism has little weight in relation to the numerical or material balance of forces in play (MENDES, 2014) . The principal means of terrorism is, therefore, the psychological effect of generating fear in the population.
In regard to objectives, Diniz (2004) understands terrorism as a political phenomenon, arguing that its final objective is the altering of a given status quo.
However, with the intention of avoiding generalizations, and the comparison of unlike situations to one another, Diniz (2004) differentiates what he calls "the non-terrorist political use of terror from the terrorist political use of terror" (DINIZ, 2002, p. 210 ).
The main difference between these two concepts lies in the link between the act and the intended political objective. In the case of the non-terrorist political use of terror, the side that makes use of terror looks to directly influence the behavior of its target. The strategic bombardment of Japan during the Second World War, which made explicit use of terror, could be considered an example of this practice (MENDES, 2014) .
Concerning the terrorist political use of terror, on the other hand, this link is indirect.
Assuming that the entity making use of terror does not currently have the capacity to achieve its objectives, the use of terror is an attempt to alter the correlation of forces in its favor in the future, raising awareness for its cause and/or denouncing the abuses perpetrated by its opponent. As we understand it, this analytical distinction is important, because it allows us to distinguish between terrorist actors by the use of terror. Furthermore, it does not exclude 'a priori' a certain grouping from being understood as a state actor.
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Anchored in such a distinction, we present below the delimiting axes for a comparison between al-Qaeda and ISIS. The next section will analyze al-Qaeda. Afterwards, we will outline ISIS.
Al-Qaeda 8

Context of origin
The formation of al-Qaeda cannot be separated from the Soviet invasion of After the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia.
However, he found U.S. troops who had been installed there since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, an act he considered unacceptable because it implied the presence of foreigners in sacred Muslim lands. This was how his already-explicit opposition to the U.S. increased, as well as his antagonism to the Saudi regime, and it led him to get involved with groups opposed to the Al Saud monarchy. As a result of these acts, bin Al-Qaeda's next destination was Afghanistan, at the time dominated by the Taliban regime. According to Stern and Bergen (2015, p. 179) , al-Qaeda subordinated itself, at least formally, to the Taliban through a commitment agreed to by bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the Taliban's leader at the time. At the beginning of 1997, the Taliban authorized the opening of training camps in Afghanistan for al-Qaeda's use. Estimates highlight that between 10,000 and 20,000 volunteers were trained after bin Laden gained control of those spaces (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 2004, p. 67) . This aid, however, was not free: US$20-30 million of al-Qaeda's annual pre-9/11 budgets would fill the Taliban's coffers every year (BYMAN, 2015a, p. 22) .
After the 9/11 attacks, the pressure on the Taliban to turn over bin Laden increased extraordinarily. In response to the regime's refusal to do so, Operation
Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001. On November 13, 2001, the Taliban fell, but neither its main leaders nor bin Laden were found. It is estimated that al-Qaeda lost at least 80% of its members and training camps (BYMAN, 2015a, p. 42 ).
However, even though its capacity to act was harmed, al-Qaeda played prominent roles in other terrorist attacks, particularly an attack on a synagogue in Tunisia, an explosion In that same 1996 'fatwa', there were countless accusations against the Saudi regime, which in addition to having allowed infidels to enter the Holy Land -the most sacred places for Muslims, Mecca and Medina, are in Saudi Arabia -also suspended Islamic law, wasted the oil wealth of the country, and ignored the Palestinian cause, among other crimes (BYMAN, 2015a). Furthermore, it also declared al-Qaeda's support for the conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Palestine. However, for bin Laden, the first step was to defeat the U.S. so that victory could then be achieved in these local conflicts (COLL, 2014) .
To sum up, we can conclude that the political objective of al-Qaeda, reflecting in part the political and ideological orientations of fundamentalist Muslim imagery, is to revert what they consider to be the Muslim world's situation of submission vis-à-vis the West. The initial goal would be to concentrate efforts against the U.S., considering it the main cause of the missteps of the countries of the regions. The next step would then be ___________________________________________________________________________ 12 Jihad is a term with many possible meanings, usually divided between lesser and greater jihad. Greater jihad refers to the effort or struggle of the believer to stay faithful to God's designs. Lesser jihad is a combination of external efforts to protect the community and the faith from external attacks (NASSER, 2014) . 13 According to Roy (1994) , a 'fatwa' is a legal decision, issued by a religious authority, that discusses topics not mentioned in traditional Muslim sources. It also clarifies the most correct interpretation of Islamic norms. to overthrow the apostate regimes, creating the conditions for the emergence of authentic Muslim governments.
Methods of action
The definition of the U.S. as the primary target of al-Qaeda points to an asymmetry of forces between the contenders: it deals with an organization that, in 2001, had 70,000 members spread out in cells in at least 60 countries (WILLIAMS, 2002, p. 06) versus the main military power of the world. It is our framework that lets us define alQaeda as a terrorist group. According to Diniz, "terrorism is intrinsically, and not just empirically, a stratagem of the weak" (DINIZ, 2004, p. 212) . We then have the use of terror with the intention to alter the correlation of forces, but it is not expected that the terrorist act in itself will directly alter the result in favor of the group.
The statement above can be evaluated by looking at the concrete impacts of the terrorist attacks. By way of illustration, it is estimated that the execution of the 9/11 attacks cost about US$500,000 (BYMAN, 2015a, p. 32) and culminated in the death of 2,977 people, along with the additional cost of US$40 billion relative to the insurance of the Twin Towers and nearby buildings (BAUMANN, 2014, p. 90) . Note, therefore, that significant damage was caused, but that the correlation of forces between the U.S. and alQaeda was certainly not affected.
Besides, the statement cited above can also be evaluated through the prism of al-Qaeda's finances. Most of their resources are directed to carrying out terrorist attacks 14 , but they also subsidize affiliated networks, as well as provide resources for cells spread out through other countries and for the families of terrorists who have been imprisoned or killed. With relation to revenue, al-Qaeda seeks to not restrict itself to just one sponsor country. Initially, the personal fortune of bin Laden financed their actions 15 , but after their expulsion from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden had his personal resources blocked by the government.
___________________________________________________________________________
14 According to data assembled by Byman (2015a, p. 111) , other terrorist attacks provoked by alQaeda were also relatively cheap. According to Byman, the attack on the USS Cole destroyer in 1998 costed US$10,000, just like the attacks in Madrid (2004) . The cost of the attacks on the London metro were somewhere around 8,000 GBP. 15 It is estimated by something around US$1 million were sent annually by his family, above all from 1994 on (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 2004, p. 170).
As a result, al-Qaeda had to diversify its sources of income. From then on, the most notable sources were donations raised from Muslim groups and millionaires from
Arab countries who were sympathetic to the jihadist cause (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 2004). Furthermore, in addition to being a propaganda tool, the Internet showed itself to be capable of being an efficient means for obtaining resources because al-Qaeda and various other groups began to use it to raise and transfer resources (JACOBSON, 2010) . We should also draw attention to the financing coming from criminal activities; according to reports, kidnapping has become an important source of resources and, at least since 2008, the sum raised from it adds up to about US$125 million 16 .
Despite these diverse sources of financing, this total would not sustain a direct confrontation with the U.S.; it does, however, allow for the funding of terrorist acts. We therefore have more important evidence that the link between the acts and al-Qaeda's political objective is indirect, which allows us to categorize al-Qaeda as a terrorist group in the terms we have proposed here.
ISIS 17
Context of origin
If the origin of al-Qaeda was a response to the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, Objectives Like Al-Qaeda, the origin contexts cited above point to the relevance that U.S.
interference in the Middle East, and the military intervention in Iraq, in particular, had on ISIS's emergence. Likewise, the status quo that it so longed to alter was also one of asymmetry between Muslim countries and the West. The difference, as one will see, rests in the justifications for the goals sought by ISIS, as with the means of action, which will be explored in the next section.
Like al-Qaeda, ISIS also was significantly influenced by Wahhabi teachings, which rejected any religious innovation, warned against cultural influences, and argued that only some Muslims were faithful believers (McCANTS, 2015, p. 151) . In ideological terms, however, the biggest difference between the groups was perhaps the apocalyptic bias of ISIS. According to McCants (2015, p. 22) , a good part of its members shares the idea of the Mahdi, a prophetic figure that will lead all Muslims in a battle against the infidels. It deals with a process of purifying Islam, to the degree that some chosen ones will determine who should be extirpated from the political community, as well as those from outside it who threaten that same community. Furthermore, Baghdadi, in addition to having a degree in Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad and having worked as an Imam in Baghdad and Fallujah, considers himself to be a direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad, which would legitimize even more his interpretation of Muslim teachings.
This vision of the world presents relevant implications, above all about the definition of enemies of the caliphate. Among its list of antagonists, ISIS believes that it must begin to eliminate those who are closest, such as the Shiites and Kurds, for example. In this sense, al-Baghdadi draws from the same belief as Zarqawi about the necessity of a strong territorial base in the Middle East, without which his struggle will fail (NAPOLEONI, 2016). In the last instance, the objective of ISIS, according to Stern and Bergen (2015) , is the formation of a transnational caliphate that needs, however, a local starting point. The U.S. and other European countries certainly are on the list of targets, as are the apostate monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the Alawite regime of Syria, and the Shiite governments of Iraq and Iran. It is for this reason that ISIS's resources and actions are dedicated primarily to these local and regional theaters, or, as Zarqawi used to say, "the road to Palestine passes through Amman" (cited in WARRICK, 2015, p. 65).
All told, the political objective of ISIS is also the reversal of the situation of the Muslim world's submission. However, in contrast to al-Qaeda, such a reversal has, as stages, the territorial affirmation of ISIS, which implies the definition of local and regional enemies. This is to be carried out without overlooking, however, the threat that external actors such as the U.S. offer to the fulfillment of such objectives.
Methods of action
To reach the objectives delineated above, it is possible to argue that ISIS has, roughly, two types of main strategies, each of which is related to one of its tasks. With relation to the territorial consolidation of the caliphate, the strategy used is to build a state while its transnationalization involves other means, among them the terrorist political use of terror.
Both the U.S. military intervention in Iraq and the civil war in Syria can be considered destabilizers of a political order in the Levant region. It does not seem unreasonable to us to state that these events created the conditions for a political revolution, understood here in the terms of Stinchcombe (1999) , as "a rapid change, at times erratic, in the relative power of social classes, ethnicities, regions, political parties, military groups" (STINCHCOMBE, 1999, p. 51) , among others. Stinchcombe (1999) defends the argument that revolutions end as long as the governments that emerge from them are able to brake the rhythms of changes in relative power and reduce the uncertainties about who and what policies will govern in the long term. Taking this path, it seems to us that the events above allowed for ISIS to undertake a war of conquest on the territories and incite a political revolution in the region. The conquest of a territory the size of the United Kingdom is a more concrete example of this. The second step, however, is understanding which strategies for political stabilization ISIS used.
Appropriating Stinchcombe's (1999, p. 62) For the case in point, the organization structure of ISIS is based on the idea of 'wilayat', or provincial subdivisions with their own governors and administrative units that, to some degree, replicate governmental structures (STERN and BERGEN, 2015, p. 51) . This has to do with an organization with a reasonable level of sophistication, that counts on an itinerant judiciary system and police force that execute their sentences in public (NAPOLEONI, 2016, p. 72) . Such an institutional design has as a goal not only the control of the areas it has seized, but also that of minimizing the impact that the occasional death of one of its leaders could have on the functioning of the organization.
In addition to political bargains with the population for the establishment of a new government structure, another strategy of the foremost importance is the provision of services. According to Napoleoni (2016, p. 18) , reports from residents of territories under ISIS domination have indicated that the arrival of the group has coincided with improvements in administration and in the daily functioning of its villages. ISIS has renovated roads and highways, improvised free community kitchens and looked to guarantee the supply of energy. Furthermore, it has also provided social programs, such as vaccination campaigns (NAPOLEONI, 2016, p. 60) . These actions are evidence not only of a preoccupation in establishing legitimacy with the populations of the occupied territories, but they also point to efforts to control the territories because, for example, the repair of highways is fundamental for the movement of troops.
However, we cannot forget another facet that has made ISIS become known worldwide: the episodes of abuse and violence perpetrated in its territories. There are many cases of children recruited for combat who, in their training, learn, among other things, to decapitate people (STERN and BERGEN, 2015, p. 211) . No less revolting are the occurrences of abduction and slavery, targeted primarily against ethnic and religious minorities. According to data from August 2014, at least 7,000 women have been captured (STERN and BERGEN, 2015, p. 216) . Furthermore, the population that lives in the dominated territories is obligated to adopt ISIS's radical worldview or face death by execution (NAPOLEONI, 2016, p. 16 ).
These and other examples allow us to state that ISIS's strategy of local control entails the provision of services and the non-terrorist use of terror, that is, that the use of terror is directly linked to the objective of controlling the local population in the present moment. The construction undertaken by ISIS echoes the analogy of Tilly (1985) about the formation of European states: it has to do with a protection racket that extracts resources from the population to protect it from threats -be they real, imaginary, or even results of the actions of the government itself.
With respect to the transnationalization of the caliphate, Stern and Bergen (2015, pp. 281-282) One can see more clearly that it is in this sphere of activity that the terrorist political use of terror is employed. Some of the stages highlighted above, primarily the second, fourth, and seventh, make use of terror to try to transform in the future the correlation of forces on behalf of ISIS.
Like with the case of al-Qaeda, we can also compare ISIS's complexity through the prism of its finances. As opposed to bin Laden's al-Qaeda, which to a large degree depended on donations, there are reports that Baghdadi's organization administers various financial resources, especially stemming from the annexation of production centers and oil fields. The exportation of petroleum, for example, generates something around US$2 million per day, without even mentioning the fact that ISIS collects taxes on companies that negotiate in its territories, just as with kidnappings of foreigners (NAPOLEONI, 2016, p. 26) . It is estimated that ISIS' resources reach the figure of US$2 billion (NAPOLEONI, 2016, p. 27) , which allows for a reasonable degree of independence for action.
Given ISIS's ambitious goals, it needs human resources, particularly soldiers, to carry them out. The total number of militants is difficult to pin down. Some assert that, (NAPOLEONI, 2016, p. 58) . We should also add foreign combatants to these numbers. According to Napoleoni (2016, p. 89), it is estimated that at least 12,000 combatants act together with ISIS's ranks, with 2,200 of them coming from Europe, attracted by the possibility of contributing to the creation of a new political order in the Middle East. The first of these is about the main conceptual difference between al-Qaeda and ISIS. According to an ISIS combatant in an interview with the New York Times, the main difference is that "al-Qaeda is an organization and we are a state" 21 . Through the prism adopted here, such a difference is derived from distinct political objectives, despite the two organizations mirroring the desire to reverse a status quo of the submission of the Muslim world to the West. As a result, equating both groups as terrorist would be imprecise.
Final Considerations
ISIS is a more complex organization which ultimately aimed to reconfigure the attacks that are relatively cheap and have the goal of transforming the correlation of forces in the future, ISIS -given its ambition to have a regional foothold -makes nonterrorist use of terror while also, however, incentivizing the terrorist use of terror, above all in Europe. Such a consideration reinforces the arguments against ideas that argue for a direct causality between religion and terrorism. A second consideration is relative to combat. As we have seen, terrorism is a response to a specific sociopolitical juncture and it is therefore not possible to ignore the influence that foreign interference has had on the formation of both groups. In the case of al-Qaeda, fighting involves fewer strategies of militarization and more investments in understanding what are logistic necessities, such as how to recruit and train militants and how to cut off financing channels. With respect to ISIS, recent reports 22 indicate that the group lost a significant portion of its territory and resources. From a regional point ___________________________________________________________________________ 22 Available at ˂http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/aerospace-defense-security/islamicstate-territory-down-60-percent-and-revenue-down-80˃. Accessed on August 05, 2017. of view, one can argue that the goal of consolidating the caliphate is collapsing, but it would be hasty to argue that the group is definitively finished. As mentioned before, ISIS has two fronts of combat, and it is the regional one that is under threat now.
This brings us to one last point, which is relative to the danger posed by both groups. Byman recently (2015b) defended the argument that al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks continue to be a threat to U.S. territory, whereas ISIS is a bigger danger to the stability of the Middle East and U.S. interests elsewhere. However, if ISIS continues to lose territory, it would not seem unreasonable to predict that ISIS could also privilege a stance closer to that of al-Qaeda, incentivizing more terrorist attacks on Europe and the U.S.
Consequently, the comparison set out here incentivizes a certain research agenda even more, such as, for example, the recruitment of militant (domestic and foreign) and the actions of lone wolves, along with reinforcing the argument that terrorism is not something that has emerged spontaneously from the Middle East. On the contrary, it is intimately linked to the functioning and the contradictions of the contemporary international system.
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